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ABSTRACT 
 
Auditors are required to communicate significant risks and audit strategy to the audit 
committee. However, the effect on perceived auditor liability of auditor disclosures to the 
audit committee has been ignored for the most part in the accounting literature. In an 
experiment, I examine how the auditor’s choice to disclose a significant risk to the audit 
committee affects jurors’ negligence assessments of the auditor. Secondarily, I examine 
whether assessments of auditor negligence vary with the auditor’s use of a specialist. I 
find that disclosing a risk to the audit committee reduces jurors’ negligence verdicts 
against the auditor. However, auditor efforts to improve audit quality through use of a 
specialist do not differentially affect negligence assessments, individually or interactively 
with disclosure choices. My results further reveal that there is no reduction of negligence 
assessments by disclosing risks to the audit committee if jurors do not have a pre-existing 
favorable view of the auditing profession and do not understand the limitations of an 
audit. Through mediation analysis, I show that these findings are consistent with 
expectations derived from psychology research examining responsibility attributions in 
settings with multiple causative agents, where jurors’ diffuse responsibility away from 
the auditor and toward the audit committee. My results contribute to practice, addressing 
one cost/benefit consideration related to disclosures to audit committees and the use of 
specialists, and to accounting research examining the legal ramifications of disclosing 
identified audit risks. 
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I. Introduction 
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) recently issued 
Auditing Standard 16 (2012; AS 16), Communications with Audit Committees. The 
objective of Standard 16 is to “enhance the relevance and timeliness of the 
communications between the auditor and the audit committee” and “foster constructive 
dialogue between the two on significant audit and financial statement matters” (PCAOB 
2012b). Subsequently, a PCAOB inspection brief describing the 2014 and 2015 audit 
inspection cycles indicated that approximately 93% of inspected audits documented some 
communication of “significant risks, including fraud risks…and the planned scope of the 
audit” (PCAOB 2016).  
In 2016, the PCAOB also proposed a revised audit reporting model (PCAOB 
Docket 34 2016b), to include the disclosure of critical audit matters in the audit report. 
The PCAOB proposal has resulted in several research papers examining the effect on 
perceived auditor liability of disclosures of critical audit matters (risks) to the public. This 
research has produced mixed findings (e.g. Brasel, Doxey, Grenier, & Reffett, 2016; 
Gimbar, Hansen, & Ozlanski, 2016; Brown, Majors, & Peecher, 2016; Sirois, Bédard, & 
Bera, 2016; Backof, Bowlin, & Goodson, 2017). Little research to date, however, has 
focused on the liability effects of disclosures of significant (but not necessarily critical) 
audit risks to the audit committee, in accordance with AS 16. My research centers on that 
gap and the potential diffusion of responsibility through auditor engagement of the audit 
committee. 
I leverage prior research in the psychology, law, and accounting fields to motivate 
my hypotheses. Studies in each of these disciplines have shown that evaluators engage in 
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attributional discounting when given a plausible alternative cause, reducing causal 
attributions to the original cause (Kelley, 1973; Heiman, 1990; Kaye, 2016; Kachelmeier, 
Schmidt, & Valentine, 2017; Backof et al., 2017). Recent literature in psychology 
studying responsibility attributions in the presence of multiple causative agents also has 
provided initial evidence that evaluators counterfactually consider the role of each agent 
in bringing about a joint outcome, resulting in a diffusion of responsibility (Chockler & 
Halpern, 2004; Prentice, 2012; Zultan, Gerstenberg, & Lagnado, 2012; Gerstenberg & 
Lagnado, 2014). Given the potential for both attributional discounting and diffusion of 
responsibility effects, I expect that the auditor’s disclosure of risks to the audit committee 
will reduce the prospective jurors’ (hereafter, “jurors”) attributions of responsibility to the 
auditor, relative to that of the audit committee. The reduced attributions of responsibility 
to the auditor will lead to lowered assessments of auditor negligence. I further expect that 
the jurors will attend to signals of quality intentions, associated with the use of a 
specialist, and in doing so, also reduce attributions of auditor responsibility and 
assessments of auditor negligence.  
Psychology research also describes the influence of jurors’ pre-existing attitudes 
on verdict decisions, which can occur through effortful processing, use of heuristics, or 
biased information search (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Pennington & Hastie, 1981; 
Patterson & Neufer, 1997; Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Alicke, 2000). Applications in 
accounting have demonstrated that jurors’ assessments of auditor negligence are 
influenced by the jurors’ pre-existing attitudes toward and expectations of the auditor 
(Jennings, Kneer, & Reckers, 1993; Arel, Jennings, Pany, & Reckers, 2012). These 
studies provide evidence that jurors with more negative pre-existing attitudes toward the 
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auditor and less understanding about the purpose and limitations of an audit are 
increasingly likely to find auditors more negligent, “regardless of the auditors’ work done 
on the audit” (Arel et al., 2012). This suggests that jurors’ pre-existing attitudes will 
moderate potential benefits gained from disclosure. Further, due to the influence of 
attitudes on information processing demonstrated in psychology studies, I expect that 
attitudes will affect jurors’ assessments of auditor negligence by affecting jurors’ 
attributions of auditor responsibility. 
To address these issues, I conducted an experiment in which I manipulated (1) 
whether the auditor disclosed a fraud risk to the audit committee or only documented the 
risk in the audit work-papers; and (2) whether the auditor utilized a forensic specialist to 
help plan audit procedures in light of the identified elevated fraud risk. I further measured 
participants’ attitudes toward auditors prior to the experiment and utilized two partitioned 
attitude measures in my analyses. Participants assumed the role of a juror and rendered 
attribution of responsibility judgments and assessments of negligence. Though my 
primary interest lies in the effects of auditor disclosure, pre-existing attitudes, and use of 
a specialist on jurors’ assessments of auditor negligence, I also measure participants’ 
attributions of auditor responsibility to gain further insight into the jurors’ decision-
making process.  
I anticipated (and found) that jurors reduced assessments of negligence against the 
auditor when the auditor disclosed the fraud risk to the audit committee. Additionally, I 
observed an interaction between jurors’ pre-existing attitudes toward the auditor and 
disclosure to the audit committee, such that disclosure only reduced jurors’ assessments 
of auditor negligence when juror attitudes toward auditors were more favorable. I further 
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observed that the joint effect of auditor disclosure and jurors’ pre-existing attitudes 
toward the auditor on assessments of negligence was mediated by jurors’ attributions of 
auditor responsibility. Those jurors who were more favorably inclined toward auditors 
recognized the oversight responsibility role held by the audit committee and diffused 
responsibility for the undiscovered fraud away from the auditor. I did not find an effect of 
auditor utilization of a forensic specialist on either attributions of responsibility or 
assessments of negligence.  
This study makes a practical contribution to the auditing profession in respect to 
disclosures to audit committees under AS 16 and the use of specialists. I also contribute 
to literatures in psychology and accounting with respect to the general area of attributions 
of “blame” under conditions of multiple causative agents. At the same time, this study 
extends research related to the specific area of legal liability. Though my study is not the 
first to examine the effects of auditor risk disclosures in a legal setting, extant research 
has largely focused on disclosures to the public (e.g. critical audit matter research by 
Brasel et al., 2016; Gimbar et al., 2016; Brown et al., 2016; Backof et al., 2017; and 
Kachelmeier et al., 2017). Mandated disclosures to the public are currently under 
consideration by the PCAOB. My study, however, examines the consequences of current 
and on-going regulations related to audit committee disclosures. Current regulations 
require auditors to disclose significant risks to clients’ audit committees, but provide little 
operational guidance as to which risks to disclose. Diverse views exist regarding the 
consequences of doing so.  
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II. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Audit Committee Responsibility and Liability 
 In my research, I examined the potential for reduced assessments of auditor 
negligence due to diffusion of responsibility toward the audit committee in a civil 
liability setting. This potential has increased in likelihood given recent mandates for 
increased audit committee responsibilities related to the oversight of the financial 
statement reporting process. These mandates have come from the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC), Congress (the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; hereafter SOX), and 
stock exchanges (through listing requirements) (NYSE, 2013; NASDAQ, 2009; SEC, 
2003; SOX, 2002). “Audit committees have become an essential means through which 
boards of directors oversee the integrity of the company’s financial reporting process, 
system of internal control, and the financial statements themselves” (PCAOB, 2010, p 2). 
Further, each of the Big Four public accounting firms has issued guidance publications to 
assist the audit committees of their clients; three major responsibilities are routinely 
identified:  
 (1) Oversee internal controls related to fraud and financial statement risks  
(2) Ensure financial statements are “understandable and transparent,” and  
(3) Regularly assess fraud risks and oversee the design and execution of remedial 
antifraud controls (EY, 2014).  
Enhanced audit committee responsibility has brought with it increased legal 
liability in cases of financial statement misstatements, consistent with “gatekeeper 
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liability” philosophy (Alzola, 2017)1; and audit committee members are more likely 
today than other board members to be named in lawsuits (Hogan, Schmidt, & Thompson, 
2014). Accounting firms’ guidance and the results of lawsuits against audit committee 
members indicate that the responsibilities attributed to audit committees are significant to 
the integrity of the financial statement reporting process. 
Nonetheless, no prior published academic research has addressed changes in 
auditor liability given the auditor’s judgment to disclose a risk to the audit committee, 
although one recent working paper has provided initial evidence of a relationship 
between the composition of the audit committee and auditor liability (Phillips, Jollineau, 
& Jane, 2015). I argue accordingly that further research in this area should be conducted 
as the role of the audit committee evolves and registers a potential effect on auditor 
liability.   
Diffusion of Responsibility through Attributional Discounting  
As jurors consider the party (or parties) legally responsible for the plaintiff’s 
losses, the actions or inactions of an informed audit committee can serve to provide an 
alternative explanation for the undiscovered fraud. This alternative explanation, 
                                                           
1
 Coffee (2002) clarifies as follows; ‘‘the gatekeeper model is a third party enforcement strategy that relies 
on the fact that it may be easier to deter a third party who has little to gain than an entrepreneur who has a 
significant stake in a questionable transaction.’’ (p. 8). Therefore, collateral liability is a sort of non-ideal 
theory. Direct deterrence is the norm for enforcing the law. But when too many wrongdoers remain 
unresponsive to feasible legal penalties, when misconduct is too expensive to detect or prosecute, when 
there are constraints on actual penalty levels, when punishing impose high administrative expenses—that 
is, when direct deterrence fails—third party enforcement serves as a remedial answer to preventing or 
precluding misconduct. (Alzola, 2017). Alzola observes “Accountants and lawyers make attractive legal 
gatekeepers because they have large and vulnerable investments in licenses and reputations, so they stand 
to lose too much if their misbehavior is detected.” Audit committee members have now been established by 
regulators as additional “gatekeepers” and as such incur related “gatekeeper liability”. 
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according to Kelley’s theory of attributional discounting (1973), should discount, or 
diffuse, the auditor’s responsibility for a negative outcome (Latane & Darley, 1968).  
Evaluators can be expected to discount “the role of a given cause in producing a 
given effect…if other plausible causes are also present” (Kelley, 1973; DiVitto & 
McArthur, 1978). In the practice of law, defense attorneys are allowed to use, and 
frequently succeed with, an “empty chair defense” strategy (KPMLAW, 2016; Kanner, 
n.d.; Kaye, 2016). The “empty chair defense” claims that a party not involved in the trial 
is responsible for the plaintiff’s losses, in efforts to diffuse responsibility and blame away 
from defendants (KPMGLAW, 2016). With a solid “empty chair defense” presentation, 
“the jury is more likely to believe that there is a player with a share of the fault who is not 
before the court and may allocate higher fault to the empty chair if it perceives the empty 
chair as having significant fault” (Peterson, 2009). 
Research examining responsibility attributions in product liability cases by 
extension suggest diffusion of legal responsibility in professional services contexts. I 
argue that auditor disclosures of perceived risks are analogous to product liability 
warnings by manufacturers and pharmaceutical companies. To this point, Laughery, 
Laughery, Lovvoll, McQuilkin, and Wogalter (1998) and Wogalter, Brantley, Laughery, 
and Lovvoll (1998) found that manufacturers were allocated less responsibility for 
product failure harm when they previously issued a warning. Even more analogous to my 
audit failure setting, Kalsher, Viale, and Williams (2003) found that manufacturers 
receive less blame for product failures when they have issued a high-quality warning to 
distributers, even when distributers failed to take action to act upon the warning.  
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Additional instances of discounting and diffusion effects can be found in the 
accounting literature. Heiman (1990) demonstrated that auditors engaged in analytical 
reviews discount their initial assessments of the likelihood of a hypothesized cause when 
alternative explanations are provided. Further, Heiman attributed the discounting effect to 
the number, not the strength, of the additional explanations (either received or self-
generated). More recently, accounting researchers have examined discounting effects in 
critical audit matter (CAM) disclosure settings, where disclosures are to the public. 
Kachelmeier et al. (2017) suggests, as do others, that the auditors’ CAM disclosures are 
effectively construed as warnings, or disclaimers of responsibility, of increased risk and 
this accounts for reduced auditor liability. Backof et al. (2017) also report that jurors’ 
perceptions of auditor control (a responsibility concept) are discounted when the auditors 
clarify the meaning of ‘reasonable assurance’ in the audit report. Taken together, prior 
and concurrent findings in psychology literature, the legal profession, and academic audit 
research support the hypothesis that attributional discounting will occur in an audit 
liability context in the presence of audit committee disclosure warnings. 
Diffusion of Responsibility through Counterfactual Reasoning  
In quite recent psychology research studying attributions of responsibility in 
settings of multiple causative agents, a number of studies further observe that 
counterfactual analyses influence many judgments of responsibility (Chockler & Halpern, 
2004; Prentice, 2012; Zultan et al., 2012; Gerstenberg & Lagnado, 2014). These 
observations in psychology are consistent with the legal concept and primacy of 
causation, which requires a counterfactual relationship between the defendant and the 
plaintiff’s harm. This counterfactual relationship specifies that the plaintiff’s harm would 
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not have occurred “but for” the defendant’s negligent actions (G’Sell, 2016). That is, A 
 B; and if not A, then not B. However, psychology and legal scholars have noted that 
the “but for” test is problematic as an outcome becomes “overdetermined” in instances 
of more than one causative agent (Wright, 1985; G’Sell, 2016; Gerstenberg & Lagnado, 
2012). That is, standard counterfactual reasoning leads to non-normative conclusions.  
To address concerns of over-determination, Chockler and Halpern (2004) develop 
a model of structural equations (the Structural Model) which relaxes the strict causation 
requirement of the “but for” test and allows a cause to be counterfactually partially 
responsible. In other words, “A is a cause of B if and only if there is a possible situation 
under which B counterfactually depends on A” (Gerstenberg & Lagnado, 2010).  
Zultan et al. (2012) and Lagnado, Gerstenberg, and Zultan (2013) extend the 
Structural Model to test partial responsibility assessments in situations where multiple 
causative agents are present. Their extended model, thus, is a model of responsibility 
diffusion. Zultan et al. (2012) identify causative agents to be responsible if they are 
pivotal in a situation, “whereby pivotal means that the outcome counterfactually depends 
on [a single party’s] action.” The assessed responsibility for each agent is determined by 
the number of counterfactual links required to make the agent pivotal, with an increasing 
number of links yielding decreased responsibility. Experiments performed by Zultan et 
al. (2012) confirm that responsibility attributions are not merely evenly diffused across 
the number of agents, but that the degree of responsibility is related to the agents’ 
pivotality. The concept of pivotality resolves the concern of overdetermination associated 
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with simple counterfactual responsibility attributions in instances of multiple causative 
agents (Lagnado et al., 2013).2  
Within this model, the auditor changes their pivotality in relation to the 
undiscovered fraud with the disclosure of risks to the audit committee. In the case of 
disclosing risks to the audit committee, the auditor adds an additional counterfactual link 
to the relationship between their audit and the undiscovered fraud thereby reducing their 
responsibility under the model, while simultaneously increasing the audit committee’s 
pivotality. Warning the audit committee of increased risks via disclosure introduces both 
(a) a second pivotal causative agent (the audit committee) and (b) a second causal 
explanation (the audit committee’s inaction or failed action). Both of these conditions 
serve to reduce the likelihood of sole assignment of the burden of responsibility on the 
auditor. This recent line of research in psychology, thus, adds additional support for 
responsibility diffusion to occur. I further expect that the diffusion of responsibility will 
reduce jurors’ negligence assessments against the auditor. 
Intentionality and Audit Legal Liability 
Negligence assessments directly relate to the degree to which the service 
professional exercised due professional care – that is, acted in a manner consistent with 
legislative and regulatory mandates and consistent with what other professionals would 
have done. Arguably, defendants’ conduct also may be evaluated on the basis of their 
intention to exercise due professional care (Proving Fault, 2017). Intentionality (scienter) 
is admittedly very difficult to discern and argue in most legal proceedings absent direct 
                                                           
2 Lagnado et al. (2013) nonetheless acknowledges that while their model is “intuitive” and arguably 
descriptive of lay responsibility assessments, it is not necessarily normative, nor necessarily complies with 
standards of admissibility in courts. Still, it is instructive with regard to jury deliberative processes. 
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conspiracy (Park, 2017). Still, jurors may infer intentionality, even when directed by the 
court otherwise. Specifically, I expect jurors will infer the auditor’s positive intentions to 
discover potential frauds when the auditor warns the audit committee of risks. Speaking 
to this point, when proposing the current AS 16 standard, the PCAOB noted, “an audit 
committee that is well-informed about accounting and disclosure matters relating to the 
financial statements under audit might be better able to carry out its role of overseeing the 
audit and the financial reporting process” (PCAOB, 2010).  
When the auditor is more proactive in communicating perceived risks, I expect 
that jurors will infer greater positive auditor intent. Jurors’ inferences about greater 
positive intention, in turn, are expected to reinforce beliefs of lower responsibility and, 
therefore, reduce assessments of negligence against the auditor. Tension admittedly 
exists, given prior research examining the influence of hindsight bias. That research 
suggests that disclosing risks to the audit committee may increase perceived 
foreseeability, working against auditors’ interests by suggesting auditors should have 
done more. That is, when assessing auditor liability, jurors (and judges) have been found 
to fall prey to a phenomenon known as hindsight bias, or the ex post belief that the 
outcome was “relatively apparent in foresight” and more should have been done (Lowe & 
Reckers, 1994; Anderson, Jennings, Lowe, & Reckers, 1997; Jennings, Lowe, & Reckers, 
1998; Kadous, 2001). Further, some recent research has reported that auditor 
documentation of risks, in the planning stages of an audit, leads to juror perceptions of 
greater outcome foreseeability; and those perceptions of greater foreseeability, in turn, 
have been linked to higher negligence assessments (Gimbar et al., 2016; Backof et al., 
2017). Nonetheless, I expect that the positive effects of diffusion of responsibility, gained 
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by disclosure to the audit committee, will over-shadow the negative effects of perceptions 
of enhanced foreseeability.  
In summary, I expect that the warning given to the audit committee, in the current 
environment of significant audit committee responsibilities for financial statement risk 
oversight, will result in a recognition that multiple pivotal parties contributed to the 
undiscovered fraud. In this case, where the increased risk was known, and therefore 
foreseeable, to both the auditor and the audit committee, jurors will perceive, I contend, 
that the auditor has lower relative (and not sole) responsibility for the undiscovered fraud. 
Therefore, I expect that the audit committee engagement via disclosure will reduce 
negligence attributions to the auditor.  
H1: Risk disclosures to the audit committee by the auditor will decrease jurors’ 
assessments of auditor negligence. 
Though I expect to find reductions in negligence assessments when the auditor 
discloses increased risks to the audit committee, research and practice in law, along with 
research in psychology and accounting, suggests that the effect may be moderated by 
jurors’ pre-existing attitudes toward the auditor. I turn to this discussion next. 
Juror Attitudes in Psychology Research 
Legal decision-making models initially portrayed jurors as mathematical 
reasoners, able to weigh and evaluate individual pieces of information independently 
from each other in determining liability judgments (Winter & Greene, 2007). In a shift 
from these legal models, explanation-based approaches portray jurors as “active decision-
makers who interpret, evaluate, and elaborate on the trial information” (Winter & Greene, 
2007). Related research has shown that jurors’ pre-trial beliefs and attitudes indirectly 
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affect liability assessments by influencing how the information received during the trial is 
processed, stored, and retrieved (Thompson, Cowan, Ellsworth, & Harrington, 1984; 
Casper, Benedict, & Kelly, 1988; Casper, Benedict, & Perry, 1989). Kelley and Michela 
(1980) state that an individual’s attitudes can take precedence over externally provided 
environmental information in the formation of causal attributions. Further, Hans and 
Jehle (2003) observe, “attitudes tend to be more powerful predictors of verdict choices 
than demographic characteristics.” Though judges and lawyers use the voir dire process 
in an attempt to remove potentially biased jurors from jury panels, evidence exists that 
those attempts frequently fail (Hans & Jehle, 2003; Marder, 2015). Thus, participants 
serving on a jury may still be influenced by their pre-existing attitudes. 
Two explanation-based approaches “emphasize jurors’ cognitive organization or 
representation of the evidence” (Winter & Greene 2007). Both approaches incorporate 
preconceptions and prior beliefs. First, Pennington and Hastie (1981, 1992, 1993) provide 
evidence in their seminal “story model” that jurors use their prior experiences and 
attitudes as a basis to construct narratives about trial evidence. Evidence inconsistent with 
jurors’ pre-existing beliefs is discounted or disregarded (Hans & Jehle 2003). Pennington 
and Hastie (1992) also found that jurors’ liability judgments are based upon their 
constructed narratives. Therefore, the attitudes upon which jurors base their narratives 
influence the effortful assimilation of information and, by extension, their final judgment.  
Chen and Chaiken’s (1999) heuristic-systematic model similarly recognizes that 
jurors may not choose or have the capacity to fully engage in effortful information 
processing. Rather, jurors may rely upon heuristics as a mental mechanism to make sense 
of complex trial information in order to reach a final determination of culpability. 
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Anchoring and adjustment is one such heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1975) and it has 
been shown especially to apply where evaluators engage in attributional discounting 
across multiple causative agents (McClure, 1998). “Juror beliefs often serve as invisible 
anchors in the courtroom” (Anderson, 2012). After anchoring on their pre-existing beliefs 
and attitudes, jurors utilizing heuristic processing make minor adjustments to their initial 
judgments upon learning of alternative causes (Morris & Larrick, 1995). The anchoring 
and adjustment heuristic often leads to under-adjustment (Jones, 1979); where jurors 
under-adjust from their initial attitudes toward defendants, their final judgments are 
influenced in the direction of their initial attitudes. 
Other explanations also exist for the biased influence of prior beliefs and attitudes 
on legal judgments. Noted above, efforts to remove biased jurors from the jury panel are 
not always successful. While limitations in the trial process (e.g. running out of 
peremptory challenges) may result in jurors with explicit, or reportable, biases, it is also 
probable that jurors hold implicit biases that they cannot self-report in voir dire 
questioning (Kang, Bennett, Carbado, & Casey, 2011). Jurors engaging in confirmation 
bias are likely to overweight evidence supporting and underweight evidence contradicting 
their pre-existing attitudes (Lord et al., 1979; Patterson & Neufer, 1997; Carlson & 
Russo, 2001). In addition to seeking or discounting evidence in a biased manner, jurors 
may also be motivated by their pre-existing attitudes to assign blame to parties in the 
trial. Alicke (2000) posits that an evaluators’ overall blame assessment is a combination 
of an initial expectation and a blame validation process, where “observers are inclined to 
blame the actor or actors who (a) arouse the most negative affect or (b) whose behavior 
confirms unfavorable expectations” (Alicke, 2000). Where jurors are motivated to assign 
15 
blame, their pre-existing attitudes can influence the direction of their final liability 
judgments. 
Juror Attitudes in Applied Research 
More applied studies of juror decision-making also frequently report that jurors 
use personal beliefs and attitudes in attributing causal responsibility for bad outcomes. 
One of the largest bodies of research relating to the influence of initial beliefs is research 
pertaining to the effects of pretrial publicity. Though I do not manipulate juror receipt of 
pretrial publicity in my experiment, I nevertheless expect that jurors’ pre-existing 
attitudes toward auditors have been similarly formed from prior experiences and prior 
public information about auditors and audit failures. I argue that findings in this area of 
research are analogous to my setting. Research on pretrial publicity examines the effects 
of negative pretrial impressions (i.e. attitudes) on liability, finding that jurors do not 
disregard their initial impressions about defendants when making their verdict decisions 
(Steblay, Besirevic, Fulero, & Jimenez-Lorente, 1999). Specifically, Ruva and Guenther 
(2015) found that jurors who were exposed to negative pretrial publicity about the 
defendant believed the defendant to be less credible, interpreted ambiguous trial facts in a 
pro-prosecution manner, and rendered guilty verdicts more frequently than jurors who did 
not receive negative pretrial publicity. In a meta-analysis of pretrial publicity research, 
Steblay et al. (1999) likened negative pretrial publicity to “a belief framework of 
defendant culpability” which “directs the juror's attention and provides a filter through 
which subsequent evidence is perceived.” The jurors’ use of negative initial impressions 
to construct a framework and evaluate evidence within this framework is consistent with 
Pennington and Hastie’s (1981) story model.  
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Juror Attitudes toward Auditors 
Relevant accounting research has also demonstrated that jurors’ negligence 
judgments can be highly influenced by pre-existing attitudes toward auditors (Jennings et 
al., 1993; Arel et al., 2012).3 Jennings et al. (1993) tested the interaction of jurors’ pre-
existing attitudes toward auditors with the auditor’s use of a decision aid. In the absence 
of a decision aid giving specific audit guidance, they found that jurors with more negative 
pre-existing attitudes rendered higher liability judgments. The researchers noted that the 
decision aid appeared to serve as an anchor for jurors and, without the decision aid, the 
jurors anchored on their pre-existing attitudes. Arel et al. (2012) tested the interaction of 
jurors’ pre-existing attitudes toward auditors with the auditor’s reliance on the work of 
the client’s or outsourced internal auditors. The researchers found that jurors’ negative 
attitudes significantly affected negligence assessments, regardless of the auditor’s 
reliance on either internal audit group or audit quality. Though research examining the 
effect of juror attitudes on assessments of auditor liability are few in number, the results 
of existing work provide consistent evidence that jurors’ pre-existing attitudes toward the 
auditor do matter in determining liability outcomes. 
Joining evidence from law and accounting research with psychological models of 
juror decision-making, I hypothesize that jurors’ pretrial attitudes toward auditors will 
interact with auditor disclosures to influence jurors’ evaluations of auditor negligence. In 
                                                           
3 Most recently, Backof (2015) tested the relationship of jurors’ impressions of the auditor 
(favorable/unfavorable) with assessments of auditor control over a financial misstatement. The researcher 
found evidence that a relationship does exist, such that favorability of impressions is negatively related to 
perceptions that the financial misstatement was foreseeable to the auditor. While the findings of Backof 
(2015) appear somewhat consistent with findings from the body of pretrial publicity research, it is 
important to note that the post-experimental question about juror impressions of the auditor cannot be 
established as a causal factor of juror liability assessments. 
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particular, jurors with a general favorable (unfavorable) bias toward auditors and a low 
(high) level of understanding about the limitations of an audit will use these attitudes as 
prior expectations to frame or anchor their assessments of the auditor (Frank, Lowe, & 
Smith, 2001; Kadous, 2001; Arel et al., 2012; Backof, 2015). More specifically, I expect 
that evaluations of the auditor’s negligence in the presence of disclosure will be less only 
when jurors’ pre-existing attitudes are more favorable.  
H2: Pre-existing juror attitudes will interact with disclosures/non-disclosures to 
the audit committee such that disclosures will associate with lower negligence 
assessments only in the presence of more favorable pre-existing attitudes. 
Mediated Moderation 
 Psychology research has established that attitudes can influence juror evaluations 
through multiple paths. According to Pennington and Hastie’s (1981) story model, 
attitudes influence the effortful assimilation of information. According to Chen and 
Chaiken’s (1999) heuristic-systematic model and Tversky and Kahneman’s (1975) 
heuristic processes, attitudes can serve as an anchor which jurors adjust from based on 
subsequent evidence received. Further, pre-existing attitudes can motivate blame and 
responsibility assignments (Alicke, 2000) or lead jurors to seek and overweight 
confirmatory evidence (Lord et al., 1979; Patterson & Neufer, 1997; Carlson & Russo, 
2001). In each of these models, attitudes affect the way information is received and 
processed.  
As discussed above, I expect a diffusion of responsibility to occur under 
conditions of audit committee disclosure, resulting in lower assessments of auditor 
negligence. I further expect that the extent to which responsibility is diffused will depend 
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on jurors’ pre-existing attitudes. Specifically, I expect that when jurors have favorable 
pre-existing attitudes toward the auditor, the beneficial effect of disclosing risks to the 
audit committee will be mediated by diffusion of responsibility for the undiscovered 
fraud away from the auditor. However, when the juror has negative pre-existing attitudes 
toward the auditor, disclosure of increased risks to the audit committee will be unable to 
shift responsibility away from the auditor and, therefore, reduce negligence assessments. 
H3a: Pre-existing juror attitudes will interact with disclosures/non-disclosures to 
the audit committee such that disclosures will associate with lower attributions of 
responsibility only in the presence of more favorable pre-existing attitudes.  
H3b: Jurors’ attributions of responsibility will mediate the influence of juror pre-
existing attitudes and audit committee disclosures on assessments of negligence. 
Improving Audit Quality- Use of Forensic Specialist 
 Normatively, auditors should be evaluated based on the quality of their work, and 
not solely on outcomes. Bad outcomes can follow good decisions; and good outcomes 
can follow bad decisions. Accordingly, auditors who perform higher quality audits should 
be evaluated more positively. There are a number of both quantitative and qualitative 
audit program options that auditors might implement to improve audit quality (CAQ, 
2014). The cost and benefits of different options, of course, are often difficult to assess, 
and especially so in hindsight.  
Among common options available to the audit team is the use of an industry or 
functional specialist, such as a technology, fraud, or valuation expert. Auditing standards 
recommend, but do not mandate, that auditors use specialists (SAS 99; SAS 109). The 
use of a forensic, or fraud, specialist has been shown to yield net benefits, including 
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greater incidence of fraud discovery, although costs can be significant (Brazel, Carpenter, 
& Jenkins, 2010; Jenkins, Negangard, & Oler, 2013). It is my contention that the 
auditor’s decision to use an expensive forensics specialist speaks to the issue of auditor  
intentionality to do a high quality audit; that is, to do what is necessary to avoid bad 
outcomes (Backof, 2015). Prior research has found that the use of a specialist can 
favorably influence jurors’ liability evaluations (Kadous, 2000; Reffett, Brewster, & 
Ballou, 2012; Grenier, Lowe, Reffett, & Warne, 2015; Brown, Grenier, Pyzoha, & 
Reffett, 2016). 
Tension nonetheless exists. Actions taken with the intention to mitigate failures 
also can remind evaluators that the actor is aware of heightened risk. Accordingly, an 
enhanced level of audit quality has not always been found to be sufficient to reduce 
liability assessments in the event of a bad outcome, and sometimes increase liability 
assessments (Kadous, 2000; Reffett, 2010; Reffett, 2011; Maksymov & Nelson, 2016). It 
always can be asserted that whatever the auditor did, it was too little under the 
environmental conditions. As an example, the decision to use a forensic expert from 
another firm or from another office within a national firm may provide a highly salient 
signal of not only auditor intent but also the audit team’s motivating expectation of a 
heightened risk of fraud occurrence. In this regard, Backof (2015) finds that jurors 
perceive accounting misstatements to be more foreseeable when the auditor’s 
documentation indicates heightened risk concerns. This increased expectation of 
foreseeability can be attributed to jurors’ use of heuristic processing and their dependence 
upon outcome-consistent facts that are easily brought to mind (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1973; Backof, 2015). Recently, Maksymov (2016) provides experimental evidence that 
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actions taken by management to compensate for internal control failures signal increased 
foreseeability of the failure. Thus, prior accounting studies suggest that actions taken with 
the intention to mitigate failures also can remind evaluators that the actor is aware of 
heightened risk, and may not have adequately compensated. 
The predicted effects of the use of a specialist on a final assessment of auditor 
negligence, thus, are complex. That is, the use a specialist may increase perceptions of 
foreseeability (working to the disadvantage of an auditor defendant) but also increase 
perceptions of positive auditor intentions and due process (working to the advantage of 
an auditor defendant). Although limited in number and utilizing a variety of specialist 
types and settings, prior accounting research regarding the use of a specialist generally 
indicates that use of a specialist improves jurors’ negligence assessments (Kadous, 2000; 
Kadous, 2001; Reffett et al., 2012; Grenier et al., 2015; Piercey, Simon, & Stephens, 
2016; Brown et al., 2016) though not necessarily through changes in perceived intent. 
Kadous (2000, 2001),  Reffett et al. (2012) and Grenier et al. (2015) manipulated 
consultation with an inventory specialist; and found that jurors reward higher audit 
quality efforts with lowered negligence awards.4,5  Sonnier et al. (2012) similarly found 
that auditors who are industry specialists receive a lower likelihood of negligence 
                                                           
4 Kadous (2000) (or Kadous, 2001) only finds a reduction in auditor negligence assessments associated 
with higher audit quality (i.e. using an inventory specialist) when the consequences of the audit failure are 
moderate (or not specified), rather than severe. While the audited firm in my experiment ends in 
bankruptcy, with large creditor losses (analogous to Kadous’ severe consequences condition), I do not (1) 
incorporate large investor losses or (2) make salient that a significant number of employees lost their jobs. 
Therefore, it is not clear ex ante how severe the experimental participants will consider the consequences of 
the audit failure to be in their evaluations of auditor negligence and blame. 
 
5 In Grenier et al. (2015), the specialist manipulation involves the specialist receiving a bribe from the 
client and subsequently lying to the auditor. Thus, while the authors find a main effect of reduction in 
negligence assessments from using a specialist, it is not apparent if participants were more motivated to 
shift blame to the specialist away from the auditor. 
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assessments than those auditors who are not industry specialists. Piercey et al. (2016) 
found that industry specialist auditors are less likely to be held liable for undetected fraud 
than for undetected errors, though they do not find differences between the liability of 
industry specialist vs non industry specialist auditors when there is undetected fraud. 
Brown et al. (2016) found that using a valuations specialist to evaluate management’s 
valuation of asset-backed securities results in lower negligence assessments. In light of 
these findings, I predict and test a main effect for using a specialist on negligence 
assessments. However, predicting interactions with disclosure and/or attitudes appears 
highly speculative, given the lack of findings related to intentionality by Backof (2015) 
and Gimbar (2016). Accordingly, I do not hypothesize any interactions.  
H4: The use of a forensics specialist by the auditor will decrease jurors’ 
assessments of auditor negligence.  
III. Experimental Design 
Design 
 My experiment used a 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 between-participants design, manipulating 
the auditor’s fraud risk disclosure to the audit committee at the beginning of the annual 
audit and the auditors’ use of an internal forensic specialist to plan audit procedures 
related to an account with elevated fraud risk. I also use two partitioned measures of pre-
existing juror attitudes: cynicism and understanding.  
Participants 
One hundred twenty-nine jury-eligible adults participated in the study, recruited 
from the Amazon Mechanical Turk (“MTurk”) crowdsourcing website. Participants were 
paid $2.00 via their Amazon accounts for an average of 24 minutes. MTurk has been 
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shown to be representative of the United States population (Paolacci, Chandler, & 
Ipeirotis, 2010) and to provide results replicable of prior judgment and decision-making 
research (Paolacci et al., 2010; Horton, Rand, & Zeckhauser, 2011). Other recent audit-
focus juror studies utilizing MTurk to gather participants include Rasso (2014), Grenier 
et al. (2015), Brown et al. (2016), Brasel et al. (2016), and Maksymov and Nelson (2017). 
When establishing a worker MTurk account, workers must certify that they are at 
least 18 years of age, which is the age required to sit on a jury (Amazon Mechanical Turk 
2014). Amazon confirms identifying information, including social security number and 
age, with the IRS (Amazon Payments, 2016). To represent the judicial requirement that a 
person be a United States citizen, I utilized the MTurk qualifications functionality to 
allow only participants accessing the survey from an IP address located within the United 
States. I eliminated four sets of responses from workers indicating they work in the 
accounting or law fields, as these prospective jurors are likely to be eliminated from the 
jury pool during voir dire proceedings. 
Materials and Experimental Procedure 
 Participants who chose to access my task in MTurk read an initial description 
stating the case was about jury decision-making. Participants were notified that they must 
correctly answer 80% of attention checks in the case. If they consented, participants were 
directed to one of four instruments, administered via Qualtrics. Participants read a brief 
description of the case, rated self-assessment statements about personal attitudes, and 
then read background information about the audit process, the role of the audit 
committee, the auditor, and the circumstances surrounding the negligence case. 
Throughout the background readings, participants were required to answer five multiple-
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choice questions designed to ascertain their comprehension of the background material. 
Those participants who began the survey but did not accurately answer 80% (or four of 
five) of the comprehension check questions correctly were eliminated from the 
experiment prior to giving their responses to the dependent measures.6  
Remaining participants then read about the audit for an in-home entertainment 
streaming company, the audit outcome, and a civil negligence case brought against the 
auditor for undetected financial statement fraud. The plaintiff, a commercial bank, 
claimed losses on a loan given to the audited company after the company was forced into 
bankruptcy following a covered-up revenue fraud scheme perpetuated by a mid-level 
manager. Both plaintiff and defense positions were described. Subsequently, participants 
assessed auditor liability and answered manipulation check, supplemental, and 
demographic questions. 
Manipulated Independent Variables 
 Assigned conditions represented a manipulation of how the auditor documented 
or communicated fraud risks (i.e., documented only in the audit work-papers or also in 
early audit communications to the audit committee) and a manipulation of forensic 
specialist involvement in the audit team planning session (participated and did not 
participate).  
 Under both significant risk disclosure conditions, the auditor had determined that 
the audit fraud risk for subscription revenue was significant and required a “greater than 
                                                           
6 Those who did not complete the task, either because they elected to quit or were eliminated, were not 
compensated, and any information received prior to their departure from the task is excluded from further 
analysis. 
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normal” level of audit work. In the work-paper documentation (audit committee memo) 
condition, the audit partner judged that the risks identified over subscription revenue 
would not (would) be communicated with the audit committee. The risks and audit 
procedures described in the instrument are identical across all conditions. 
In both forensic specialist manipulations, participants were informed that the audit 
team identified subscription revenues as a significant audit fraud risk and the audit 
partner was aware of risk factors such as rapid industry growth conditions and fierce 
competition among the company and competitors for customer subscriptions. In the no 
specialist involvement condition, the partner did not request assistance from a forensic 
specialist. In the specialist involvement condition, a team of two forensic specialists from 
the audit firm’s national office joined in the audit planning meeting and recommended 
audit procedures for subscription revenues. Planned audit procedures were the same 
across both conditions, regardless of forensic specialist involvement, holding actual audit 
quality constant across these conditions. 
Moderating Variables – Pre-existing Attitudes 
 To ascertain jurors’ pre-existing attitudes, I used a psychometric measure of 
attitudes toward auditors, which has been demonstrated to influence juror negligence 
assessments in prior accounting literature (Reckers, Jennings, Lowe, & Pany, 2007; 
Jennings, Pany, & Reckers, 2008; Arel et al., 2012). At the beginning of the experiment, 
participants used an 11-point scale to indicate their level of agreement with statements 
about auditors and the audit profession. The statements and their mean, median, and 
mode responses are included in Appendix A. Using principal components analysis (PCA) 
with varimax rotation, the statements were factored into two different attitudes, 
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measuring participants’ cynicism about auditors and understanding about limitations 
inherent in the audit profession. For use in analysis as categorical measures, I split these 
factors at the median and responses above (below) the median were classified as “high” 
(“low”).7 To test predictions that juror attitudes interact with auditor disclosure, I use the 
two partitioned variables as measured independent variables in all analyses to represent 
jurors’ pre-existing attitudes toward auditors.  
Dependent Variables 
Following prior literature (Kadous, 2000 and 2001; Reffett, 2010; Reffett et al., 
2012; Backof, 2015, Grenier et al., 2015; Maksymov & Nelson, 2016; Brown et al., 
2016), the experiment measured participants’ evaluations of auditor negligence through a 
scaled assessment of negligence probability (0 = Not at all probable and 10 = Completely 
probable) and a yes/no auditor negligence verdict decision. Those participants who 
rendered a “negligent” verdict decision also were asked to decide on appropriate 
compensatory damages against the auditor ranging from $0-$9 million, where $9 million 
represented the total loss by the plaintiff when the audit client declared bankruptcy due to 
fraudulent revenue recognition. 
After assessing the auditor’s negligence, jurors responded to questions assessing 
the auditor’s responsibility for not discovering the fraud (0 = Not at all responsible, 10 = 
Completely responsible) and the audit committee’s responsibility for not discovering the 
                                                           
7 The cynicism factor primarily consists of the statements “The big auditing firms make plenty of money in 
the good times, so they should also share in the stockholders' losses in the bad times” and “The big 
corporations and their big auditors (CPAs) work hand-in-glove and only tell the public what they want to 
tell them,” with factor loadings of 0.78 and 0.85, respectively. The understanding of auditor limitations 
factor primarily consists of the statements “The financial statements contained in the annual report to 
stockholders are primarily the responsibility of corporate management, and not of the external auditor” and 
“External auditors cannot look at every client transaction. They must rely on samples and tests of 
relationships in conducting the audit,” with factor loadings of 0.61 and 0.74, respectively. 
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fraud (0 = Not at all responsible, 10 = Completely responsible). I calculated a net 
measure of relative auditor responsibility by subtracting beliefs of audit committee 
responsibility for the undiscovered fraud from beliefs of auditor responsibility for the 
undiscovered fraud. The result is a continuous measure of relative auditor responsibility, 
where +10 equals full responsibility toward the auditor and -10 equals full responsibility 
toward the audit committee, which I use to test the mediation hypotheses H3a and H3b. 
Covariate 
Given the hypothesized influence of pre-existing attitudes on jurors’ judgments of 
auditor negligence, I expect that jurors’ level of general expectations of others could also 
influence their negligence assessments and should be controlled in my analyses. In 
particular, jurors’ level of perfectionism is a trait that jury consultants watch for in the 
jury selection process (Plotkin, 2007). As Plotkin noted, perfectionists “make decisions in 
a far more demanding and careful way” and “have significantly different definitions of 
preponderance.” Hewitt and Flett (1991) developed a model of perfectionism, which 
captures one’s standards of performance for (1) themselves based on internal motivations, 
(2) themselves based on social motivations and, (3) others. Of particular interest, those 
with high standards of performance for others, or “other-oriented” perfectionists, “expect 
others to be perfect, and are highly critical of others who fail to meet these expectations” 
(Stoeber, Sherry, & Nealis, 2015). Because the auditor defendant has already proven to 
be imperfect by missing the financial statement fraud, I expect that jurors with high 
other-oriented perfectionism traits will be more critical of the auditor. Therefore, I utilize 
the “other-oriented perfectionism” scale to control for general expectations. Specifically, 
participants in my experiment responded to an 11-point scale indicating their agreement 
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with 15 self-assessment statements about their expectations of others. Factor analysis 
(PCA with varimax rotation) of these 15 items yielded three factors, with one factor 
loading on general statements about others.8 I used this factor, labeled “General 
Expectations” as a covariate in my analyses, and found it significant. 
IV. Results 
Manipulation Checks 
Participants answered two manipulation check questions immediately after giving 
their negligence and damage assessments, indicating whether or not the audit partner 
determined to communicate the increased subscription revenue risk to the audit 
committee and whether or not the audit team utilized a forensic specialist. Participants 
answered the two manipulation checks with 75.2% and 80.8% accuracy, respectively. To 
verify further that the independent manipulations affected the manipulation check 
responses, I numerically coded the manipulations and manipulation check responses and 
performed separate ANOVA analyses for each manipulation. In these analyses, I use the 
manipulations as the independent measures and the manipulation check question 
responses as the dependent measures. Doing this, I confirm significant differences in 
means (p < 0.01) between the manipulation conditions, relative to the check question 
responses. Given these differences between the independent manipulation groups, my 
                                                           
8 The factor loadings for general expectations include the following statements: I am not likely to criticize 
someone for giving up too easily; It doesn’t matter when someone close to me does not do their absolute 
best; I do not have very high expectations for those around me; I do not expect a lot from my friends; It 
does not matter to me when a close friend does not try their hardest; and I seldom expect others to excel at 
whatever they do. Factors loadings are 0.52, 0.53, 0.61, 0.54, 0.73, and 0.71, respectively. 
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main analysis includes all participants, following recommendations from Kotzian, Stöber, 
Hoos, & Weissenberger (2015).9  
Tests of Hypotheses 
The descriptive statistics of participants’ auditor negligence assessments are 
shown in Table 1, Panel A and Table 2, Panel A. I formally test H1 and H4 using both a 
logistic regression model for the binary verdict dependent measure and an ANCOVA for 
the continuous probability of negligence measure.10 I formally test H2 using only the 
ANCOVA analysis, due to overfitting of the logistic regression model. Table 1, Panel B 
shows the logistic regression results and Table 2, Panel B shows the ANCOVA results. I 
test H3a and H3b using a bootstrapping analysis macro, developed for SPSS by Hayes 
(2013), which enables the simultaneous testing of moderation and mediation 
relationships. Table 4 shows the results of the mediated moderation test. 
  
                                                           
9
 When I limit my analysis to those participants that passed both manipulation checks, the number of 
participants available for analysis reduces to 117. Using only participants correctly answering the 
manipulation questions, results for all hypotheses are consistent with results obtained using all participant 
responses. 
 
10 Though I collect damage assessments from those participants who give a “negligent” verdict, there is 
significant unevenness in the number of participants in each cell assessing damages. In addition, the 
number of participants in some cells results in insufficient data to perform analysis. Therefore, I am unable 
to perform meaningful tests of differences in damage assessments. 
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TABLE 1 
 
 
Jurors' Negligence Verdicts 
 
Panel A: % of Jurors Finding Audit Firm Negligent Proportion [Percentage] 
 
 
Workpaper 
Documentation 
Audit 
Committee 
Disclosure 
Total 
No 
Specialist 
24/34 
70.6% 
10/32 
31.3% 
34/66 
51.5% 
Specialist 
15/30 
50.0% 
10/29 
34.5% 
25/59 
42.4% 
Total 
39/64 
60.9% 
20/61 
32.8% 
59/125 
47.2% 
  
      
Panel B: Binary Logistic Regression  
Dependent Variable: Verdict        
Independent Variable df χ2 
p-value 
(two-tailed)   
General Expectations 
Disclosure 
1 
1 
3.060 
11.160 
0.080 
<0.01 H1  
Specialist 1 0.867 0.352 H4  
Disclosure x Specialist 1 0.914 0.339   
Constant 1 11.106 <0.01   
      
Disclosure and Specialist are manipulated between low and high experimental conditions.  
General Expectations are a continuous factor measuring general perfectionism standards of others. 
Verdict is the jurors’ yes/no decision of auditor negligence after reading the experimental materials.  
 
In H1, I predicted that the auditor’s choice to disclose/not to disclose increased 
fraud risk to the audit committee would serve to reduce jurors’ negligence assessments. 
As predicted, I found a significant main effect such that disclosure of the fraud risk 
reduced negligence assessments for both the binary verdict (p < 0.01, two-tailed) and 
continuous negligence probability dependent variables (p = 0.011, two-tailed). My results 
are consistent with Brasel et al. (2016), Brown et al. (2016), and Kachelmeier et al. 
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(2017), which find that increased disclosure of risks (albeit to the public) reduces auditor 
liability.  
                  TABLE 2 
 
                 Jurors' Negligence Probability  
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (Marginal Mean, (Standard Deviation), and [n]) 
 
 
Workpaper 
Documentation 
Audit 
Committee 
Disclosure 
 
No 
Specialist 
5.82 
(2.443) 
[34] 
4.44 
(2.501) 
[32] 
5.15 
(2.549) 
[66] 
Specialist 
4.77 
(2.837) 
[30] 
4.38 
(2.781) 
[29] 
4.58 
(2.762) 
[59] 
 
5.33 
(2.667) 
[64] 
4.41 
(2.584) 
[61] 
 
  
      
Panel B: Analysis of Covariance11    
Dependent Variable:   Probability of Negligence  
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F 
p-value 
(two-
tailed) 
 
General Expectations 29.972 1 29.972 5.180 .025  
Disclosure 38.234 1 38.234 6.608 .011 H1 
Specialist 3.271 1 3.271 .565 .454 H4 
Disclosure x Specialist .514 1 .514 .089 .766  
Disclosure x Cynicism    
x Understanding 
 
21.424 
 
1 
 
21.424 
 
3.703 
 
.057 
 
H2 
Error 659.569 114 5.786    
a. R Squared = .246 (Adjusted R Squared = .180)  
       
   
                                                           
11 Though the analysis utilized a full factorial ANCOVA model (excluding interactions of specialist with 
attitudes), only those conditions of interest are reported herein in the interest of brevity. 
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Disclosure and Specialist are manipulated between low and high experimental conditions. 
Cynicism and Understanding are binary high/low median splits of factors measuring pre-existing 
cynicism toward auditors and understanding of the audit profession limitations, respectively. 
 General Expectations are a continuous factor measuring general perfectionism standards of others.  
Probability of negligence is the jurors’ probability assessment of whether the audit firm was 
negligence on a scale from 0=Not at all probable to 10=Extremely probable.  
 
In H2, I predicted that jurors’ pre-existing attitudes toward the auditor would 
moderate (interact with) the auditor’s disclosure choice in jurors’ determination of 
negligence. Due to the number of independent variables, use of the factorial logistic 
regression model required to use the binary negligence verdict as a dependent variable 
results in overfitting of the model. Therefore, I use the ANCOVA model and the 
probability of negligence dependent variable in Table 2, Panel B to test this hypothesis. 
As noted in Table 2, Panel B, H2 is confirmed for the interaction of auditor disclosure to 
the audit committee and jurors’ pre-existing attitudes (p = 0.057). In particular, 
examination of the means in Table 3 indicates that the jurors’ greatest evaluation of 
auditor negligence occurred when the auditor did not disclose the risk to the audit 
committee and jurors indicated high cynicism of the auditor and low understanding of 
audit limitations (probability of negligence = 6.846). In this such case, when jurors’ 
attitudes were most unfavorable to the auditor (i.e. high cynicism and low understanding 
of limitations, disclosure did not significantly reduce negligence assessments (difference 
in means = -0.907; p = 0.319). Conversely, the jurors’ lowest evaluation of auditor 
negligence occurred when the auditor did disclose the risk to the audit committee and 
jurors had low cynicism of the auditor and high understanding of audit limitations 
(probability of negligence = 2.387). In this such case, when jurors’ attitudes were most 
favorable to the auditor (i.e., low cynicism and high understanding of limitations), lack of 
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disclosure did significantly increase negligence assessments (difference in means = 
3.193; p < 0.01).  
 TABLE 3 
 
Jurors' Negligence Probability: Disclosure and Attitudes 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (Marginal Mean, (Standard Error), and [n]) 
 
 
Workpaper 
Documentation 
Audit 
Committee 
Disclosure 
Difference 
in Means 
Low 
Cynicism/Low 
Understanding 
4.135 
(0.733) 
[11] 
3.677 
(0.525) 
[21] 
0.458 
p = .614 
Low 
Cynicism/High 
Understanding 
5.580 
(0.556) 
[20] 
2.387 
(0.766) 
[10] 
3.193 
p < .01  
High 
Cynicism/Low 
Understanding 
6.846 
(0.631) 
[16] 
5.939 
(0.632) 
[15] 
0.907 
p = .319 
High 
Cynicism/High 
Understanding 
4.873 
(0.568) 
[18] 
4.741 
(0.624) 
[15] 
0.132 
p = .877 
  
 
The results of the interaction between auditor disclosure of risks to the audit 
committee and two pre-existing attitudes toward the auditor further illuminate the effect 
of disclosure on the probability of the auditor being found negligent. Specifically, though 
the significant main effect found in testing H1 appears to indicate that auditors can reduce 
their liability by disclosing risks to the audit committee, the significant interaction found 
in testing H2 indicates that the choice to disclose is most effective in the sample of jurors 
who have more favorable beliefs about auditors prior to participating in the civil trial. 
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In H3a and H3b, I predicted that jurors’ evaluations of the auditor’s relative 
responsibility for the undiscovered fraud would mediate the joint effect of auditor 
disclosure and pre-existing attitudes on negligence assessments. To test these hypotheses, 
I utilize the PROCESS macro for SPSS developed by Andrew Hayes (2013). The macro 
utilizes bootstrapping to derive a confidence interval for indirect effects of the proposed 
mediator. The use of bootstrapping helps to avoid problems associated with both smaller 
sample sizes and non-normality in the sampled population (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). I 
use Model 11, a mediated moderation model conceptually depicted in Figure 1, with my 
calculated measure of net responsibility utilized as the identified mediator. 
  FIGURE 1 
Mediated Moderation - PROCESS Model 11 
 
From Hayes (2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As demonstrated in Table 4, Panel 2, the result of the PROCESS bootstrap 
analysis shows that increased diffusion of responsibility away from the auditor toward the 
audit committee (i.e., lower relative responsibility) does decrease evaluations of 
negligence (β = .4370, p < 0.01), consistent with expectations. Further, the mediated 
moderation predicted in H3a and H3b is also confirmed through the PROCESS analysis. 
Cynicism 
Auditor's Relative 
Responsibility 
Disclosure Negligence Assessments 
Understanding 
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In Panel D, the conditional indirect effect of the disclosure x cynicism x understanding 
interaction is shown to be significant (i.e. the 95% confidence interval does not include 
zero) only when cynicism is low and understanding of audit limitations is high. The 
coefficient of this indirect effect is negative (β = -1.4071; 95% CI [-2.4735, -.5569]), 
demonstrating that jurors are influenced by their initial attitudes when determining 
auditor negligence. 
TABLE 4 
 
Moderated Mediation- PROCESS macro with Disclosure 
 
Test of H3a and H3b 
 
Panel A: Effect of Disclosure choice on Relative Responsibility12 
 
                    β       SE               t          p-value        
Constant                -12.0766     3.4919      -3.4585      <.001 
General Expectations     .3312        .2340         1.4151      .1597 
Disclosure               14.0871     4.6645        3.0201      .0031    
Disclosure x Cynicism x  
Understanding    5.0364     1.8441        2.7311      .0073 
 
Panel B: Moderated Mediation Model, DV = Probability of Negligence  
 
                      β         SE               Z          p-value        
Constant          5.5354      .2949       18.7707       <.001      
General Expectations     .4837       .2148         2.2517       .0261 
Relative Responsibility    .4370       .0812         5.3790       <.001      
Disclosure      -.9634        .4287       -2.2471       .0264      
 
Panel C: Direct effect of Disclosure choice on Probability of Negligence 
 
     Effect           SE                Z           p-value        LLCI       ULCI 
     -.9634        .4287         -2.2471        .0264        -1.8121     -.1146 
 
 
 
                                                           
12 Though the analysis utilized a full factorial model, only those conditions of interest are reported herein in 
the interest of brevity. 
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Panel D: Conditional Indirect effect (through Relative Responsibility) at Attitude Levels 
 
Cynicism       Understanding      Effect       Boot SE    Boot LLCI    Boot ULCI 
Low     Low      .8019           .4970         -.1076          1.7772 
Low    High          -1.4071           .4935         -2.4735          -.5569 
High    Low     -.1424           .2705          -.6863            .3854 
High    High     -.1504          .3413          -.7995            .5413 
 
Finally, in H4, I predicted a decreasing main effect when the auditor chose to 
improve audit quality by utilizing a forensic specialist. As identified in Tables 1 and 2, 
my results found that, while both the rate of negligence verdicts and the assessed 
probability of negligence are lower when the auditor uses a fraud specialist, these results 
are not significant (p = 0.352 and p = 0.255, respectively).  
As noted above, I did not predict an interaction between auditor disclosure and 
use of a forensic specialist, given the highly speculative nature of the prediction. In Panel 
B of Tables 1 and 2, I observe that the interaction of these two choices is insignificant for 
both binary verdict and continuous probability negligence measures (p = 0.339 and p = 
0.766, respectively). Based on the descriptive statistics observed in Panel A of Tables 1 
and 2, I compare the means of the no specialist/no disclosure condition with the other 
three conditions. In untabulated analysis, I find that the assessed probability of negligence 
in the no specialist/no disclosure condition is significantly greater than the probability of 
negligence in both the no specialist/disclosure and specialist/disclosure conditions (p = 
0.027 and p = 0.013, respectively). The probability of negligence assessment in the no 
specialist/no disclosure condition does not significantly differ from that of the 
specialist/no disclosure condition (p = 0.214). Results are similar using the binary verdict 
response as the dependent measure; all results consistently indicate that there is no 
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interactive effect of auditor risk disclosure to the audit committee and use of a specialist 
on negligence assessments. 
V. Supplemental Discussion of the Culpable Control Model  
Recently, some accounting researchers have utilized the Culpable Control Model 
developed in psychology (Alicke, 2000; Lagnado & Channon, 2008; Alicke, Rose, & 
Bloom, 2011) in attempts to integrate the blame sharing phenomenon across settings 
(Backof, 2015; Gimbar et al., 2016; Backof et al., 2017). The Culpable Control Model 
(CCM) focuses primarily on the relationship between perceived control and blame 
attribution (Alicke, 2000; Lagnado & Channon, 2008), and secondarily on antecedents to 
perceptions of control: perceptions of causation, perceptions of intentionality, and 
perceptions of foreseeability. Causation relates to whether a person or entity objectively 
caused the outcome, and additionally depends on the sufficiency of the actor’s 
contribution in causing the negative outcome (Lagnado & Channon, 2008). Intentionality 
relates to whether a person’s actions are perceived as purposeful or accidental (Alicke, 
2000; Lagnado & Channon, 2008). Foreseeability is related to perceptions of the degree 
to which a person should have anticipated the outcome of their action (Alicke, 2000; 
Lagnado & Channon, 2008). Conceptually these three contributing factors are distinct, 
but they are structurally interdependent “in the sense that assessing one aspect of control 
may affect estimations of other components” (Alicke, 2000). One recent study has 
observed them to load on a single factor (Backof, 2015). It should also be noted that in 
legal proceedings, arguing intent (scienter) is very difficult and thus absent from many 
legal models of drivers of legal liability (Wegman, 2007; Park, 2017). 
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Though the CCM was not developed as a model for determining legal liability, 
the components contributing to perceptions of control may nonetheless still contribute to 
non-directed juror deliberative analyses. As such, I considered and examined the model’s 
applicability in my setting, as have other accounting researchers. At the most 
foundational level, accounting research has demonstrated that jurors’ perceptions of 
auditor control do affect liability assessments (e.g., Backof, 2015; Gimbar et al., 2016; 
Backof et al., 2017). These specific studies also tested whether their research 
manipulations altered participants’ perceptions of intent, causation, and foreseeability. No 
accounting studies investigating auditor liability to date, however, have tested a full CCM 
structural equation model (SEM) considering all research manipulations and the entire 
structure of the CCM simultaneously; or, if they have, their results have not been 
reported. Without an SEM test, it remains an empirical question as to which settings the 
CCM model applies, with some appropriate skepticism as to whether it fits as well in the 
legal liability setting as it does blame attribution experiments in psychology. 
To examine the applicability of the CCM in my experimental setting, I performed 
ANCOVA analyses to determine if auditor disclosure, jurors’ pre-existing cynicism, and 
jurors’ pre-existing understanding of audit limitations affect jurors’ perceptions of 
causation, intent, and foreseeability. These three dependent variables were derived from 
supplemental questions asked of experimental participants after they provided negligence 
assessments. These questions measured causation (from 0 to 10, “to what extent were the 
auditors (audit committee) responsible for discovering the fraud?”), intent (from 0 to 10, 
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“to what extent did the auditors intend to discover the fraud?”), and foreseeability (from 0 
to 10, “how foreseeable do you believe the instance of fraud was to the auditors?”).13  
Given the theoretical framework of my experiment, I focused my primary 
analyses on the diffusion of responsibility aspect of causation. Therefore, the results of 
testing the relevance of this CCM link to my setting are provided in my test of H3a and 
H3b above. I find no significant effect of disclosure, either as a main effect or 
interactively with the two measures of pre-existing attitudes (p = 0.290 and p = 0.430, 
respectively) on perceptions of intent. Similarly, I find no significant effect of disclosure, 
either as a main effect or interactively with the two measures of pre-existing attitudes (p 
= 0.180 and p = 0.329, respectively) on perceptions of foreseeability. I only find effects, 
as reported above, with respect to causation/responsibility. Thus, my findings do not 
support the CCM. My findings are not entirely unique. Gimbar et al. (2017) findings also 
failed to support the intentionality dimension of the CCM, as did research by Backof 
(2015).The results of testing the CCM in my experimental setting may offer additional 
insight into the use of this framework in a legal liability setting and may provide 
additional considerations to future researchers in this area.  
VI. Conclusion 
 In this dissertation, I report the results of an experiment examining the main and 
interactive effects of auditor risk disclosures to an audit committee and jurors’ pre-
                                                           
13 Consistent with the analysis performed by Backof (2015), principal components analysis loads these 
measures on a single factor (eigenvalue = 1.410), which accounting researchers leveraging the CCM 
framework have utilized as a measure of auditor control. Of note, though these three components loaded on 
to a single factor with eigenvalue greater than 1, a second factor (eigenvalue = 0.983) did manifest. 
Examination of the factor loadings for each of the three components indicated that, though foreseeability 
and causation have high factor loadings (0.825 and 0.819, respectively), intent has a much smaller factor 
loading (-0.241). In addition, the components of foreseeability and causation are significantly correlated (r 
= .393, p<0.01), while intent is not correlated with either foreseeability or causation. 
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existing attitudes toward the auditor. I also examine whether auditors reduce negligence 
assessments when they choose to engage a fraud specialist. 
 My research contributes to both practice and research. Practically, audit teams 
must decide which risks to discuss with the audit committee (if any). Alerting audit 
committee members in a timely fashion to certain risks is shown in my experiment to 
enable some jurors to diffuse responsibility away from the auditor and toward the audit 
committee in determining auditor negligence. My findings, however, also report that this 
outcome is conditional on pre-existing juror attitudes. That is, auditors only achieve a 
reduction in negligence assessments among jurors with more favorable pre-existing 
attitudes toward the auditor.  
Additionally, auditors are faced with cost /benefit tradeoffs on each audit 
engagement; the decision to use a specialist, while more costly, might be expected to 
influence perceived audit quality. My study suggests that there may be limited or no 
courtroom benefit to the additional cost of using a specialist if an audit failure eventuates. 
Potential perceptions of increased audit quality do not appear to add protection against 
negligence assessments when the auditor first discloses the risk to the audit committee. 
Future research could measure perceptions of the significance of the risk between having 
a specialist and not having a specialist. 
Future research can continue to offer valuable insights to audit firms related to 
their disclosure choices. This study is limited by the use of participants as jurors without 
engaging in a rigorous voir dire process, as would be expected in a natural courtroom 
setting. Therefore, participants may not be representative of individuals who survive a 
sophisticated jury selection process. This study was also limited to the discussion of only 
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one significant risk area, though auditors consider numerous risks in the course of an 
audit and must exercise professional judgment in narrowing down the number of 
identified risks for communication with the audit committee. Future research can 
examine negligence assessments in the presence of multiple disclosed risks. Additionally, 
I utilize a low-complexity financial statement account and a corresponding specialist that 
does not contribute a large amount of expertise in the face of uncertainty. Regulators and 
accounting researchers are more closely examining the difficulties surrounding audits of 
complex estimates (PCAOB, 2014; Griffith, Hammersley, & Kadous, 2015; Rasso, 2015; 
Joe et al., 2015; Brown et al., 2016). Future research could provide evidence about jurors’ 
evaluations of auditor negligence for disclosures and specialists associated with financial 
statement accounts inherently containing greater ambiguity and complexity. 
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PARTICIPANTS’ ATTITUDES TOWARD AUDITORS 
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Attitudea Mean Median Mode 
The big auditing firms make plenty of money in the good 
times, so they should also share in the stockholders' losses in 
the bad times!b 
5.54 5 5 
The big corporations and their big auditors (CPAs) work hand-
in-glove and only tell the public what they want to tell them.b 
5.12 5 5 
External auditors cannot look at every client transaction. They 
must rely on samples and tests of relationships in conducting 
the audit.c 
6.74 7 9 
The financial statements contained in the annual report to 
stockholders are primarily the responsibility of corporate 
management, and not of the external auditor.c 
6.48 7 8 
a. Respondents indicated their level of agreement with each statement on a scale of 0 = Strongly Disagree 
to 10 = Strongly Agree 
b. These two statements loaded on a single factor, called “Cynicism”. Factor responses were split at the 
median value and classified as “high” and “low” for analysis. 
c. These two statements loaded on a single factor, called “Understanding”. Factor responses were split at 
the median valueand classified as “high” and “low” for analysis. 
  
 
